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$e research focuses on a sample of 26 Italian real estate asset management companies (Società di Gestione del Risparmio
“SGR”)—whose asset management is totally linked to real estate funds—that considers a period of six years (2013–2018). Using
some variables extrapolated from the internal accountability of each SGR, the analysis investigates possible relationships between
them to verify the presence or absence of economies of scale of Italian real estate management companies by multivariate
regressions. $e results show that there is no single model for profit maximization and cost minimization, but all depends on the
business model that each SGR decides to adopt.
1. Introduction
Both researchers and professionals agree that numerous and
significant changes affected the real estate industry over the
last twenty years [1–7]. $e uncertainty about the trend in
the real estate industry in the near future is high and is
expected to increase [8]. Anyway, with quantitative easing
and negative interest rates in Europe, attention in real estate
asset class is more and more increasing.
Finance is gaining progressively more importance in
every macroeconomic industry, in general, and in the real
estate market, in particular [1, 9–11].
$e main role of finance is to raise funds at the lowest
cost. Real estate is a “capital intensive” industry and needs a
lot of capital, from the smallest development operations to
the largest investments. Finance is also useful in investment
analysis; real estate represents an important asset class in
both institutional and private portfolios. Analyzing the real
estate investment with a financial approach is therefore
fundamental. In fact, more andmore space has been given to
the evaluation of all economic, income, equity, and financial
factors affecting the management of real estate portfolios
with a consequent impact on the portfolio ability to produce
profit. $ese quantitative factors became as significant as the
qualitative (material and architectural) characteristics of real
estate [12].
On the other side, the number of companies offering
services in the real estate market increased, resulting in higher
competition both nationally and internationally [1]. All this
led to greater exposure of national operators to threats and
opportunities with consequent competitive challenges
[13–15]. In this scenario, the real estate industry faced several
changes, increasingly dealing with new logics and stake-
holders, with ever-changing organizational and structural
dynamics. $is continuous transformation implied more and
more interest in the organizational models of the companies
providing asset management services (in Italy, the so-called
“Società di Gestione del Risparmio”—SGR).
$is interest is also due, on the one hand, to the need to
identify more efficient production assets (in a context of
reinvigorated requests for the protection of investors in
financial instruments exposed to stock market turbulence)
and, on the other hand, to the increase of demand for
improving the quality of the offered services [16].
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$ese structural and organizational changes led over the
years to mergers, acquisitions, and consolidation of real
estate asset management companies, with a consequent
increase in company size. Economies of scale are the cost
advantages that companies gain from their scale of operation
(typically measured by the amount of output produced),
with cost per unit of output decreasing with increasing scale.
By transferring this notion to the real estate asset
management industry, it can be assumed that as real estate
portfolios increase in size, the incremental cost of managing
additional properties should fall [17, 18]. So real estate asset
management companies with larger property portfolios
should be more efficient than those with smaller portfolios
[19].
While most previous studies focused on the economies
of scale in US Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), this
analysis aims to show, starting from the financial statement
data, that there are no specific economies of scale in Italian
real estate management companies.
$is study briefly summarizes the literature on the
subject and the issues arising on the matter. $en, con-
sidering some empirical research variables, it tries to find
some relationships between them to verify the presence or
absence of economies of scale of Italian real estate man-
agement companies using multivariate regressions. $e
results show that there is no single model for profit maxi-
mization and cost minimization, but all depends on the
business model that each SGR decides to adopt.
2. Related Literature
$e concept “economies of scale” means that efficiency in
production and operations increases with size. Historically,
firms in various industries often expand not only to con-
solidate their power, but also to capture these efficiency gains
[17].
In the real estate market, this type of study started to be
developed mainly from American REITs.
$e first studies, dating back to the 70s and 80s, tried to
find economies of scale. Anyway, it resulted difficult to
identify and measure economies of scale due to the different
technologies available and the lack of data [17]. In fact, early
studies suggested a “small firm effect” in American REITs:
smaller companies earned higher average returns than larger
companies [20].
At the beginning of the 90s, researchers found some
lower costs coming from the increase in the size of REITs.
Linneman [21] notes that large REITs can achieve greater
shareholder value via economies of scale with respect to
costs.
Bers and Springer [22] show that economies of scale exist
for REITs and also that economies of scale differ chrono-
logically. $e same researchers [22–24] and others [25],
using the standard approach of estimating the cost function
without allowing for the possibility of inefficient production,
find evidence of economies of scale for REITs. Capozza and
Seguin [26] find that only general and administrative costs
exhibit substantial economies of scale. Latzko [27] find
economies of scale in managing mutual funds.
Ambrose et al. [25] report that large REITs have higher net
operating income (NOI) growth, but they also show that this
ratio is weak. In the same year, Capozza and Seguin [28],
contradicting what was reported only two years earlier, find
evidence of diseconomies of scale. In their study, Anderson
et al. [29] measure technical efficiency and economies of scale
for REITs by employing data envelopment analysis (DEA), a
linear programming technique. $ey find that REITs are
technically inefficient. In particular, inefficiencies are a result
of both poor input use and failure to operate at constant
returns to scale. $e dynamics emerged for the American
REITs have recently been tested in the European real estate
market by Ambrose et al. [19], investigating the effect of firm
size on expense, revenue, return, and capital cost for Euro-
pean real estate companies and comparing the size effects of
REITs and non-REIT real estate companies. $ey found that
larger real estate companies are able to generate higher
revenue per unit of company size, incur lower costs, and
produce higher returns. Moreover, NOI ratios and return
ratios increase while selling, general and administrative cost
ratios decrease with the size of a company.
$e question of the existence of economies of scale in
real estate companies still remains important [19]. Even if
there is not yet an answer for this question, disagreements
about the concept of scale economies in real estate asset
management continue to exist.
$e uncertainty on the possible existence of economies
of scale in the real estate industry is due to multiple factors.
First factor being the market, which is characterized by
cycles of expansion and of contraction influencing its trend.
Secondly, it is difficult to quantify economies of scale: it is
easy to identify the presence or absence of economies of scale
in industries where production is quantified and measured.
In most manufacturing industries, the final output is always
an equal product generated by clear and defined input
processes. In the analysis of real estate management com-
panies, not only the final output is not easy to identify, but it
is not even homogeneous. $ird, the assumption underlying
in the studies on economies of scale is that all the companies
of the sample under investigation can benefit of the same
frontier of costs and use the same technology [17, 30]: reality
is quite different. Fourth, young, growing, and expanding
businesses need time to achieve the right size to ensure
economies of scale. No research directly addresses the ex-
istence of scale economies in Italian real estate asset man-
agement companies: SGR.
$ere are very few studies focused on Italian asset
management companies in general [16, 31, 32] in which an
analysis is carried out considering balance sheet multiples
[31] or company X-efficiencies measured to estimate a
possible efficient frontier [16, 32]. Almost absent are the
research studies referring to the Italian real estate man-
agement companies: only Abate [33] and Giannotti and
Mattarocci [34]. Both these papers show that the Italian real
estate companies represent a sector that, after a few years of
constant and high growth, did not reach the typical maturity
of the asset management industry.
$e possible reason is, on the one hand, the difficulty in
identifying a univocal and truthful representation of the
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production process of the asset management industry in the
real estate industry and, on the other, the total lack of data. In
fact, SGRs (companies that mainly manage real estate in-
vestment funds—closed funds) are not obliged to be listed
on the stock exchange.
$is analysis aims to demonstrate, starting from the
financial statement data of SGR, that there are no economies
of scale for the Italian real estate management companies.
3. The Sample
$e research focuses on a sample of 26 asset management
companies (25(the number of SGRs decreases by one unit
because two SGRs have merged) in the years 2017 and
2018) whose asset management is totally based on real
estate funds. With reference to the number of SGRs active
in Italy, the sample constitutes the 96.30% (it was not
possible to analyse 100% of the SGRs operating in Italy
because one of them is in extraordinary administration) of
the population; consequently, the database is almost
representative of reality. $e assets managed by the
companies included in the sample, as of 31 December
2018, amounted to 70 billion euros, corresponding to 85%
of the total AUM managed by all real estate asset man-
agement companies operating in Italy, calculated by the
Bank of Italy at 82 billion euros [35].
$e variables taken into account were extrapolated from
the SGRs’ confidential internal accountability which they
provided to the research team.
$e sample, considering a period of six years
(2013–2018), is divided into three different clusters, iden-
tified on the basis of the assets under management (AUM)
managed by each company included in the sample.$e three
clusters were identified by setting thresholds based on the
AUMs of each SGR as follows:
(i) Cluster 1: average AUM> 5 billion euros
(ii) Cluster 2 : 2 billion euros≤ average AUM≥ 5 billion
euros
(iii) Cluster 3: average AUM< 2 billion euros
Obviously, from one year to the next, SGRs may change
clusters. $e variables describing each of the 26 SGRs are the
following five:
(1) Net fees: they represent the amount of the budget
line no. 30 of the SGRs’ income statement scheme,
according to the Instruction of Bank of Italy named
“Il bilancio degli intermediari IFRS diversi dagli
intermediari bancari”
(2) Asset under management: this variable is equal to the
sum of the total assets of the all real estate alternative
investment funds managed by every SGR of the
sample, at the end of the year
(3) Administrative costs: they are the amount of the line
no. 120 of the SGRs’ income statement scheme,
according to the Instruction of Bank of Italy named
“Il bilancio degli intermediari IFRS diversi dagli
intermediari bancari”
(4) No. of real estate funds managed: this variable is
equal to the number of the real estate alternative
investment funds managed at the end of the year, as
reported in the explanatory note of the SGRs’ annual
financial statements
(5) Average number of employees: this variable is equal
to the average number of employees of the year, as
reported in the explanatory note of the SGRs’ annual
financial statements
In order to make the variables comparable, they have
been standardised, i.e., the following transformation has





where E(·) identifies the operator mean value and σ standard
deviation.$e purpose of this transformation is to reduce all
variables to the same order of size.
As reported in Table 1, all variables are highly cor-
related. In particular, the following pairs of variables
show a correlation of more than 90%: (net commissions,
assets under management), (administrative costs, net
commissions), (average number of employees, net
commissions), and (administrative costs, average number
of employees).
4. Empirical Results
Two multivariate regressions are performed, as other de-
pendences did not prove to be significant at the 10% level.
$e first one, as reported in Table 2, considers the asset
under management as a dependent variable and the number
of real estate funds managed and the average number of
employees for each SGR as independent variables.
$e second multivariate regression, according to Table 3,
considers net commissions as a dependent variable and the
number of real estate funds managed, personnel expenses,
and AUM as independent variables.
Each regression is performed with reference to two
scenarios. $e first scenario is represented by the entire data
sample, without any distinction between different SGRs,
while the second considers the splitting of the sample into
clusters, depending on the AUM. Dummy variables are
added to perform the latter analysis.
Before analysing the first regression, it should be con-
sidered the path followed by SGRs in terms of AUM, number
of funds, and percentage of administrative costs in terms of
AUM. As reported below, Table 4 represents the amount of
asset under management for each SGR, Table 5 represents
the number of real estate funds for each SGR, and Table 6
represents the percentage of administrative costs in terms of
AUM. Each table refers to the period from 2013 to 2018.
Over the six-year period considered, an increase in in-
vestments made in Italy through alternative real estate in-
vestment funds is observed. Indeed, the AUM analysed in
the sample shows a compound annual growth rate (CAGR)
of 7.21%. $is increase can be expressed in absolute value as
+6.6 billion euro in the last year (2018). Considering the
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entire reference period, this deviation amounts to approx-
imately +24 billion euro (+51.8%).
At the same time, there is an increase in the number of
funds (+181 alternative real estate investment funds between
2013 and 2018; +73%). Nevertheless, this growth stopped
over the past year. $is is illustrated by the smaller increase
in the number of funds in 2018: the lowest in the last 6 years
with an absolute value of +17 and a growth rate of +4.11%.
On the contrary, the AUM increased by +10.4% in 2018.
$e dynamic of administrative costs is related to the
amount of AUM and to the number of real estate funds.
More considerations about this variable are made later.
Launching the first regression, in all six years considered,
we found that the intercept is not significant at the 10% level.
By repeating the regression, we obtain the results repro-
duced in Table 7, where only significant regressors at 0.1%
and 1% level are reported.
In the analysed period (2013–2018), the AUM always
depends positively on the average number of employees and
the number of funds managed. $is empirical evidence
shows that by increasing the number of employees by one
unit compared to their average number during the year, a
higher marginal effect is achieved by a unit increase in the
number of funds. $is can be interpreted as follows: by
increasing the number of employees, the asset management
company has more resources to employ in setting up and
subsequently managing a new real estate fund and, conse-
quently, new assets from which having fees of management.
Table 1: Correlation matrix for each year.
Net fees AUM Administrative costs No. of real estate funds No. of employees
2013
Net fees 1.0000000 0.9366408 0.9203043 0.7812385 0.7872560
AUM 0.9366408 1.0000000 0.8572549 0.7694823 0.8768293
Administrative costs 0.9203043 0.8572549 1.0000000 0.8867641 0.7720600
No. of real estate funds 0.7812385 0.7694823 0.8867641 1.0000000 0.6830251
No. of employees 0.7872560 0.8768293 0.7720600 0.6830251 1.0000000
2014
Net fees 1.0000000 0.9176423 0.9083548 0.7871646 0.8014534
AUM 0.9366408 1.0000000 0.8781287 0.8051264 0.8657633
Administrative costs 0.9203043 0.8781287 1.0000000 0.9056471 0.7427939
No. of real estate funds 0.7812385 0.8051264 0.9056471 1.0000000 0.6758336
No. of employees 0.7872560 0.8657633 0.7427939 0.6758336 1.0000000
2015
Net fees 1.0000000 0.9477420 0.9496365 0.7399840 0.8903021
AUM 0.9477420 1.0000000 0.9168684 0.7787273 0.8643887
Administrative costs 0.9496365 0.9168684 1.0000000 0.7687266 0.9463153
No. of real estate funds 0.7399840 0.7787273 0.7687266 1.0000000 0.6741669
No. of employees 0.8903021 0.8643887 0.9463153 0.6741669 1.0000000
2016
Net fees 1.0000000 0.9465023 0.9509846 0.6359986 0.9216262
AUM 0.9465023 1.0000000 0.8819332 0.7457024 0.8260694
Administrative costs 0.9509846 0.8819332 1.0000000 0.5626679 0.9609642
No. of real estate funds 0.6359986 0.7457024 0.5626679 1.0000000 0.5183680
No. of employees 0.9216262 0.8260694 0.9609642 0.5183680 1.0000000
2017
Net fees 1.0000000 0.8641211 0.9738102 0.5489571 0.9383796
AUM 0.8641211 1.0000000 0.8544921 0.7638472 0.7778732
Administrative costs 0.9738102 0.8544921 1.0000000 0.5696372 0.9550878
No. of real estate funds 0.5489571 0.7638472 0.5696372 1.0000000 0.5026150
No. of employees 0.9383796 0.7778732 0.9550878 0.5026150 1.0000000
2018
Net fees 1.0000000 0.8886413 0.9628419 0.5543713 0.9310833
AUM 0.8886413 1.0000000 0.9130547 0.7538074 0.8420773
Administrative costs 0.9628419 0.9130547 1.0000000 0.6393171 0.9541886
No. of real estate funds 0.5543713 0.7538074 0.6393171 1.0000000 0.5685592
No. of employees 0.9310833 0.8420773 0.9541886 0.5685592 1.0000000
Table 2: First multivariate regression.
Response Y Asset under management
Regressors X1 Number of real estate funds managed
Regressors X2 Average number of employees
Table 3: Second multivariate regression.
Response Y Net fees
Regressors X1 Number of real estate funds managed
Regressors X2 Administrative costs
Regressors X3 Asset under management
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On the other side, increasing the number of funds by one
unit does not necessarily mean a substantial increase in the
SGR’s AUM, as there is no minimum quantum leap for
setting up a fund. Such a fund could be small in terms of size,
with a marginal impact on the SGR’s overall AUM. How-
ever, such an increase in assets would inevitably involve the
use of resources and therefore costs.
$e absence of the intercept implies that if the regressors
are equal to their average, as a consequence, the AUM is not
significantly different from its average.
Multivariate regression is later repeated on clustered
data. $e dummy explanatory variables ind_cl1, ind_cl2 and
ind_cl3 indicate membership in the different AUM-based
clusters.
More precisely, the dummy variables split the sample
into three clusters, as shown below:
(i) Ind_cl1 relates to the first cluster, which contains
SGRs whose AUM is greater than 5 billion euros
(ii) Ind_cl2 relates to the second cluster, which contains
SGRs whose AUM is bounded between 2 and 5
billion euros
(iii) Ind_cl3 relates to the third cluster, which contains
SGRs whose AUM is less than 2 billion euros
In this study, to avoid multicollinearity, the dummy
variable Ind_cl3 is not explicitly considered in the
regressions.
We now want to test whether membership to different
clusters is one of the qualitative variables relevant to the
regression. $e intercept would be the constant term for the
base group with lowest AUM, while for members of the first
and second AUM-based groups the constant term would be
the intercept plus the coefficient of the membership dummy.
Again, the results obtained for each regression are reported
after removing any insignificant regressors in Table 8.
For the time interval considered, all variables are at least
5% significant. In addition, all variables, except the intercept,
show positive coefficients. As all the variables are stand-
ardised, the negative intercept implies that when all the
regressors are zero (i.e., for the lowest AUM group), the
expected AUM is obviously lower than the average value.
$e regression shows that with obvious differences
among clusters, while in 2013 and 2018 the number of
employees is the only explanatory variable that influences
the AUM, for the period 2014–2017 the number of funds
managed is the only one having effects on the AUM.
Nevertheless, it is noted that the regressor that identifies the
number of funds impacts more modestly than the case in
which the data are not clustered.




2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
1 9.396 9.488 8.593 7.867 8.983 9.179
2 7.321 7.521 6.890 6.769 7.074 3.882
3 4.880 5.060 4.592 5.567 5.505 4.515
4 7.040 5.070 5.351 5.508 5.421 5.498
5 5.453 4.870 3.829 3.270 2.935 2.725
6 4.400 3.551 3.796 3.583 3.243 3.349
7 3.770 3.361 3.220 3.562 3.404 2.272
8 3.955 2.810 1.780 500 307 40
9 3.142 2.300 1.663 1.326 840 520
10 2.503 2.198 2.065 1.523 1.014 541
11 2.352 2.127 1.967 1.587 1.410 1.360
12 1.394 1.644 1.494 1.591 1.380 1.231
13 933 1.266 1.392 1.411 1.469 1.482
14 1.053 1.033 1.120 1.151 843 872
15 — — 1.135 1.139 850 435
16 1.518 1.179 1.036 931 820 1.036
17 1.280 1.173 1.120 919 1.007 1.003
18 1.958 1.411 1.411 773 709 497
19 1.235 1.215 804 738 659 620
20 1.152 938 653 592 540 515
21 1.137 985 943 490 501 509
22 1.018 826 814 910 756 682
23 27 29 259 299 276 356
24 48 108 171 268 334 390
25 92 100 107 229 236 236
26 473 273 117 147 258 311
Tot. 67.530 60.536 56.322 52.650 50.774 44.056
Values in italics represent cluster 1, values in bold represent cluster 2, and
values in bold italics represent cluster 3.
Table 5: Number of real estate funds for each SGR from 2013 to
2018.
SGR
Number of real estate funds managed
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
1 47 43 41 37 36 32
2 44 42 35 34 33 29
3 27 27 27 27 26 21
4 15 8 7 7 7 7
5 22 22 20 17 12 11
6 31 32 33 30 28 25
7 14 12 12 14 13 12
8 34 23 14 5 2 2
9 7 5 5 4 2 1
10 27 25 18 11 7 4
11 36 32 30 17 13 12
12 16 17 17 9 9 8
13 12 14 14 12 10 9
14 6 5 5 3 3 3
15 — — 6 6 5 3
16 19 19 19 19 18 15
17 12 12 9 8 8 8
18 6 6 3 3 3 3
19 22 21 20 18 18 15
20 5 5 4 4 4 3
21 4 3 2 2 2 2
22 12 10 8 9 9 4
23 2 7 7 10 9 9
24 1 2 2 2 3 3
25 5 4 3 4 4 4
26 4 4 3 2 2 4
Tot. 430 400 364 314 286 249
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Table 6: Percentage of administrative costs in terms of AUM.
SGR
Administrative costs in % of AUM
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
1 0.000271% 0.000273% 0.000288% 0.000331% 0.000319% 0.000292%
2 0.000277% 0.000269% 0.000267% 0.000269% 0.000323% 0.000464%
3 0.000305% 0.000287% 0.000309% 0.000219% 0.000216% 0.000252%
4 0.000503% 0.000657% 0.000573% 0.000364% 0.000109% 0.000129%
5 0.000311% 0.000327% 0.000374% 0.000355% 0.000202% 0.000157%
6 0.000268% 0.000315% 0.000294% 0.000343% 0.000372% 0.000358%
7 0.000182% 0.000195% 0.000203% 0.000196% 0.000203% 0.000340%
8 0.000184% 0.000186% 0.000220% 0.000336% 0.000437% 0.004489%
9 0.000194% 0.000253% 0.000242% 0.000184% 0.000290% 0.000260%
10 0.000255% 0.000267% 0.000253% 0.000291% 0.000378% 0.000782%
11 0.000347% 0.000358% 0.000342% 0.000337% 0.000380% 0.000414%
12 0.000421% 0.000413% 0.000401% 0.000283% 0.000336% 0.000315%
13 0.000500% 0.000590% 0.000393% 0.000378% 0.000345% 0.000279%
14 0.000311% 0.000287% 0.000270% 0.000258% 0.000256% 0.000173%
15 — — 0.000192% 0.000252% 0.000260% 0.000390%
16 0.000513% 0.000596% 0.000612% 0.000595% 0.000580% 0.000418%
17 0.000306% 0.000322% 0.000296% 0.000366% 0.000305% 0.000346%
18 0.000443% 0.000612% 0.000563% 0.000890% 0.000873% 0.001051%
19 0.000555% 0.000564% 0.000795% 0.000805% 0.000834% 0.000683%
20 0.000191% 0.000256% 0.000352% 0.000384% 0.000365% 0.000388%
21 0.000203% 0.000213% 0.000214% 0.000417% 0.000350% 0.000323%
22 0.000401% 0.000434% 0.000602% 0.000505% 0.000276% 0.000304%
23 0.003491% 0.004599% 0.000511% 0.000515% 0.000484% 0.000397%
24 0.006215% 0.002744% 0.001554% 0.001071% 0.000966% 0.001381%
25 0.001138% 0.001181% 0.001081% 0.000463% 0.000638% 0.000726%
26 0.000270% 0.000286% 0.000688% 0.000669% 0.000427% 0.000340%
Table 7: Coefficients resulting from the first regression.
Y� asset under management
Year Regressor Estimate Std. error t value Pr (> |t|) Adjusted R2
2013 No. of employees 0.87683 0.09429 9.299 9.42e− 10∗∗∗ 0.7599
2014 No. of employees 0.5921 0.1090 5.432 1.22e− 05
∗∗∗
0.8257No. of r.e. funds 0.4050 0.1090 3.716 0.00102∗∗
2015 No. of employees 0.6222 0.1157 5.380 1.4e− 05
∗∗∗
0.803No. of r.e. funds 0.3593 0.1157 3.106 0.00467∗∗
2016 No. of employees 0.60102 0.09916 6.061 2.47e− 06
∗∗∗
0.8059No. of r.e. funds 0.43415 0.09916 4.378 0.000187∗∗∗
2017 No. of employees 0.5271 0.1102 4.782 8.02e− 05
∗∗∗
0.773No. of r.e. funds 0.4989 0.1102 4.526 0.000152∗∗∗
2018 No. of employees 0.6110 0.1097 5.570 1.34e− 05
∗∗∗
0.8046No. of r.e. funds 0.4064 0.1097 3.705 0.00123∗∗
Signif. codes: ∗∗∗0.001; ∗∗0.01; ∗0.05. All variables exhibit positive coefficients.
Table 8: Coefficients resulting from the first regression on clustered data.
Y� asset under management
Year Regressor Estimate Std. error t value Pr (> |t|) Adjusted R2
2013
Intercept −0.3292 0.1237 −2.661 0.01395∗
0.8288No. of employees 0.3859 0.1706 2.261 0.03349
∗
ind_cl1 1.5280 0.4766 3.206 0.00392∗∗
ind_cl2 0.6940 0.2558 2.713 0.01240∗
2014
Intercept −0.42872 0.06451 −6.646 8.84e− 07∗∗∗
0.9375No. of r.e. funds 0.25319 0.07031 3.601 0.00151
∗∗
ind_cl1 2.14006 0.19282 11.099 1.03e− 10∗∗∗
ind_cl2 0.75379 0.15181 4.965 5.08e− 05∗∗∗
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$e second multivariate regression is carried out to
verify the dependence of net commissions. Again, the results
obtained for each regression are reported in Table 9 after
removing any insignificant regressors.
All regression coefficients show positive coefficients. In
the range considered, commissions depend positively on
assets under management and personnel expenses. Excep-
tions are the last two years during which net commissions
depend only on personnel expenses.
$is empirical evidence means that by increasing assets
(for all years except 2017–2018) or expenses by one unit
compared to their average, a similar marginal effect on net
commissions is achieved.$e absence of the intercept means
that if the regressors are equal to the average, commissions
are not significantly different from the average.
$e analyses resulting from repeating the multivariate
regression on clustered data are exactly the same as those
carried out on nonclustered data because clusterization
turns out to be not statistically significant. $ere is no ev-
idence of economies of scale: increasing assets under
management or employee expenses increases net commis-
sion costs.
Table 8: Continued.
Y� asset under management
Year Regressor Estimate Std. error t value Pr (> |t|) Adjusted R2
2015
Intercept −0.48072 0.05868 −8.192 2.85e− 08∗∗∗
0.9479No. of r.e. funds 0.20154 0.06283 3.208 0.00391
∗∗
ind_cl1 2.22211 0.17092 13.001 4.40e− 12∗∗∗
ind_cl2 1.02272 0.14032 7.288 2.04e− 07∗∗∗
2016
Intercept −0.42832 0.07138 −6.000 4.05e− 06∗∗∗
0.9211No. of r.e. funds 0.31868 0.06846 4.655 0.00011
∗∗∗
ind_cl1 2.29186 0.20763 11.038 1.15e− 10∗∗∗
ind_cl2 0.78153 0.14725 5.307 2.18e− 05∗∗∗
2017
Intercept −0.4801 0.1142 −4.205 0.000398∗∗∗
0.8633No. of r.e. funds 0.3098 0.1028 3.015 0.006599
∗∗
ind_cl1 1.9595 0.2731 7.174 4.51e− 07∗∗∗
ind_cl2 0.5950 0.2003 2.970 0.007307∗∗
2018
Intercept −0.5594 0.1007 −5.556 1.94e− 05∗∗∗
0.9052No. of employees 0.3236 0.1072 3.018 0.0068
∗∗
ind_cl1 1.7988 0.2939 6.121 5.56e− 06∗∗∗
ind_cl2 0.8902 0.1523 5.846 1.02e− 05∗∗∗
Signif. codes: ∗∗∗0.001; ∗∗0.01; ∗0.05.
Table 9: Coefficients resulting from the second regression.
Y� net fees
Year Regressor Estimate Std. error t value Pr (> |t|) Adjusted R2
2013
AUM 0.5571 0.1033 5.393 1.35e− 05∗∗∗
0.9236Administrative costs 0.4427 0.1033 4.285 0.000238∗∗∗
Number of r.e. funds managed — — — —
2014
AUM 0.5242 0.1399 3.747 0.000945∗∗∗
0.8791Administrative costs 0.4480 0.1399 3.203 0.003693∗∗
Number of r.e. funds managed — — — —
2015
AUM 0.4835 0.1237 3.910 0.000625∗∗∗
0.9342Administrative costs 0.5063 0.1237 4.094 0.000389∗∗∗
Number of r.e. funds managed — — — —
2016
AUM 0.48515 0.08832 5.493 1.05e− 05∗∗∗
0.9532Administrative costs 0.52311 0.08832 5.923 3.50e− 06∗∗∗
Number of r.e. funds managed — — — —
2017
AUM — — — —
0.9483Administrative costs 0.97381 0.04641 20.983 6.0142e− 17
Number of r.e. funds managed — — — —
2018
AUM — — — —
0.9239Administrative costs 0.96284 0.05631 17.1 1.43e− 14∗∗∗
Number of r.e. funds managed — — — —
Signif. codes: ∗∗∗0.001; ∗∗0.01; ∗0.05.
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5. Conclusions
$e analyses carried out so far have not shown any rela-
tionship that would suggest economies of scale. $e first
regression clearly showed that the assets under management,
i.e., those capable of generating income, depend on the
number of funds managed by each SGR and the number of
employees. As the number of funds increases, there is
logically an increase in assets. Also by increasing the number
of employees, there are more resources able to manage the
possible creation of new funds. $is last aspect translates in
practical terms into higher net commissions to be paid as
more resources to be employed, alias costs, and lower
profitability.
Since empirical evidence does not provide a modus
operandi to be followed to minimize costs and maximize
assets under management, it may be thought that the issue is
still little known and of great interest to all market partic-
ipants. $is uncertainty suggests policy considerations that
deserve to be further investigated.
$e absence of economies of scale could be linked to the
particular characteristics of each fund and its business
model. $is consideration deserves to be studied in greater
depth. In fact, when a “traditional” fund is established,
typically based on big asset located to primary tenants, the
management company cannot charge high unit fees. In this
case, high volumes managed do not imply high level of cost,
but also high revenues to earn. When an innovative fund
with high added value to be performed in the management
of the assets is established (this implies the presence of
unique and not easily replicable assets), the management
company may charge higher fees, due to the specificity of the
assets, with the consequent risk that management costs
increase more than proportionally.
In addition, anyway minimum management costs are
imposed by national law and supervisory authorities to
protect and safeguard the rights of all stakeholders and of the
market. $ese kinds of costs, for the part directly related to
the funds managed, do not allow economy of scale.
In summary, there is no single model for profit maxi-
mization and cost minimization, but all depends on the
business model that each real estate asset management
company decides to adopt and, consequently, on the type of
assets that are managed.
Data Availability
$e data used were obtained through the balance sheets that
each SGR provided to the Department of Business Eco-
nomics of the University of Parma.
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